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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

No. 97-0680 CA

vs.
Priority No.

15

SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the Second Judicial District Court,
Davis County, The Honorable Michael G. Allphin, presiding,
District Court Case No. 96-4702009 DA,

I.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Because this is a domestic relations matter, the Utah Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996).
II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE #1. Did the trial court err by awarding Mrs. Madsen
$550.00 per month in alimony when Mr. Madsen's expenses are such
1

that he does not have the ability to pay alimony?
The standard of review for this issue involves a challenge
to a finding of fact that will be overturned only if clearly
erroneous.

See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct.

App. 1993) (quoting Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989)).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court;

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before
the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 172), during the
testimony of Mr. Madsen before the trial court on July 10, 1997,
(Tr. at 13-14), and in Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, (R. at 100).
Marshalling of Evidence:

The trial court received the

following evidence regarding the award of alimony:
a.

At the time of trial, Mr. Madsen's gross income from his

job at Crysen Refining, Inc., was $2,716.44 per month. (Tr. at
11-13; R. at 100.)
b.

At the time of trial, Mr. Madsen had rental income of

$225.00 per month. (Tr. at 13; R. at 100.)
c.

Prior to trial, Mr. Madsen had received additional

income from work as an ice hockey and roller hockey referee, but
had discontinued the roller hockey officiating because he had
been assaulted by a player in the league. (Tr. at 14-15, 42-56,
70.)
2

d.

In 1994 (the parties' year of marriage), Mrs. Madsen1s

annual income was $19,519.14, (R. at 131). At the time of trial,
she was unsure of her income but it was between $18,000.00 per
year, (Tr. at 84), and $22,000.00 per year, (Tr. at 144). Her
sworn Financial Declaration asserted a gross monthly income of
$1,840.00, or $22,080.00 annually.
e.

(R. at 92.)

That Mrs. Madsen was owed child-support payments of

$600.00 per month by her husband from a prior marriage. (Tr. at
97-98, 145-46.)
f.

That Mrs. Madsen1s total monthly expenses were

$2,493.00, (Tr. at 134-35; R. at 99).

Mrs. Madsen's testimony

regarding individual expense items is found at Tr. 94-117.
g.

That Mr. Madsen had been arrested for domestic violence

on two (2) occasions, and that Mrs. Madsen believed the domestic
violence to have contributed to the end of the marriage. (Tr. at
135-40, 152-54.)
h.

That Mrs. Madsen believed her income to be insufficient

to meet her needs. (Tr. at 118.)
i.

That Mrs. Madsen believed her standard of living to have

fallen during the time that she had been separated from Mr.
Madsen. (Tr. at 118.)

Mrs. Madsen presented no evidence that she

gave up an alimony award to marry plaintiff or that her income at
the time of trial was less than it had ever been.
3

j.

That between the time she filed for bankruptcy in 1991

and the time she married Mr. Madsen in 1994, Mrs. Madsen
supported herself and her three children (3) on the same salary
she earned at the time of the divorce. (Tr. at 144-45.)
The evidence before the trial court regarding Mr. Madsenfs
expenses was the direct testimony of Mr. Madsen, (Tr. at 13-14),
a reduction in the sum of $246.80, stipulated to by the parties1
counsel, (Tr. at 75-76), and Plaintiff's Exhibit #1, (R. at 100).
This uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that Mr. Madsen1s total
monthly expenses were $3,048.20. Counsel for Mrs. Madsen only
cross-examined Mr. Madsen regarding his expenses for mortgage and
rent payments, (Tr. at 56-57), and never argued that Mr. Madsen's
other expenses, as testified to, were inaccurate, excessive or
otherwise inappropriate.
The trial court received the following evidence of Mr.
Madsen's contractual duties and obligations regarding the home:
a.

That Mr. Madsen had assumed the obligation of paying the

$557.00 monthly payment on the home remodeling loan. (Tr. at 56.)
b.

That Mr. Madsen was obligated to pay property taxes,

homeowner's insurance, and residential maintenance costs in the
amount of $147.00 per month. (Tr. at 13-14; R. at 100.)
c.

That Mr. Madsen's mother, Evalyn Madsen, executed a

Quit-Claim deed in May, 1996, which made Mr. Madsen and his
4

mother legal joint tenants of the home located at 136 East 1200
South, Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 32-33; R. at 166-67.)
d.

That Mr. Madsen described the property as being his

mother's property. (Tr. at 36.)
e.

That Mr. Madsen had his name placed upon the deed, via

the Quit-Claim deed, in order to reflect his investment of
$20,000.00 in proceeds received from a premarital home sale. (Tr.
at 65-66.)
f.

That Mr. Madsen*s mother continued to pay approximately

an additional $100.00 per month so as to accelerate a reduction
in the principal on the home remodeling loan. (Tr. at 56-57.)
g.

That despite signing the Quit-Claim deed, Mr. Madsen's

mother believed that she owned the property and did not intend to
give it to Mr. Madsen until her death. (Tr. at 78-79.)

ISSUE #2. Did the trial court err in its Conclusion of Law
that Mrs. Madsen was entitled to alimony for thirty-five (35)
months without making any findings of fact as to the basis for an
award for that duration?
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirezf 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah

1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
5

Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court:

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 165.)
Marshalling of Evidence:

Where the trial court's findings

are insufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful review7, an
appellant is not required to engage in a futile marshalling
exercise.

See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

No evidence was presented to the trial

court to support or justify the duration of the alimony awarded
by the trial court beyond the length of the marriage.

ISSUE #3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by
failing to consider restoring each party to their respective
premarital circumstances, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §30-35(7)(f) (Supp. 1997)?
The standard of review for this issue is one that the Court
will grant the trial court's decision some deference, reviewing
it for an abuse of discretion.

See Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d

96, 100 (Utah 1986); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 546 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court:

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before
6

the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 163, 164-65, 172), and
in Mr. Madsen's Trial Brief, submitted to the trial court on July
9, 1997, (R. at 83-84) .
Marshalling of Evidence:

The trial court received the

following evidence regarding the parties' premarital
circumstances:
a.

Between 1991 and 1994, Mrs. Madsen supported herself and

her three (3) children on approximately the same salary she was
earning at the time of this divorce. (Tr. at 144-45.)
b.

The parties' income during this marriage, and prior to

separation, was as follows:
Party

1994

1995

1996

Mr. Madsen

$49,706.78

$49,509.50

$53,370.99

Mrs. Madsen

$19,865.15

$17,103.45

$18,814.30

(R. at 120.)
c.

That Mrs. Madsen believed her standard of living to have

fallen during the time that she had been separated from Mr.
Madsen. (Tr. at 118.) Mrs. Madsen presented no evidence that she
gave up an alimony award to marry plaintiff or that her income at
the time of trial was less than it had ever been.

ISSUE #4. Did the trial court use "fault" in awarding
alimony so as to punish Mr. Madsen?
7

This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah

1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court:

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 172.)

ISSUE #5. Did the trial court err by simply awarding
alimony for the duration of the marriage without making any
findings to support the duration of the alimony award?
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah

1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court;

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsenfs counsel in his closing argument before
the trial court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 162), and in Mr.
Madsen's Trial Brief, submitted to the trial court on July 9,
1997, (R. at 84-85).

8

ISSUE #6. Did the trial court err in awarding $2,000.00 in
attorney's fees to Mrs. Madsen when the trial court did not
analyze the reasonableness of the fees and no evidence was
presented to support that award?
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah

1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court:

This issue was

presented by Mr. Madsen's counsel in his closing argument before
the trial court on July 10, 1997. (Tr. at 169, 173.)
Marshalling of Evidence:

The trial court received the

following evidence regarding Mrs. Madsen's attorney's fees:
a.

Mrs. Madsen's testimony that she owed fees and was

unable to pay them. (Tr. at 151.)
b.

Mr. Nielson's assertion that an affidavit of attorney's

fees had been prepared, although no such affidavit was made part
of the record and apparently was not submitted to the trial
court. (Tr. at 169-70.)
c.

Mr. Nielson's proffer that the amount of attorney's fees

was roughly $3,900.00, representing nearly twenty-five (25) hours
of work. (Tr. at 170.)
9

ISSUE #7. Did the trial court err in assessing legal fees
against Mr. Madsen on the basis of his legal interest in real
property when it also found that Mr. Madsen's monthly expenses
could be reduced because his mother owned the real property?
This issue is solely a question of law, with no deference to
be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah

1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Preservation of Issue in the Trial Court;

This issue was

presented during the testimony of Mr. Madsen before the trial
court on July 10, 1997, (Tr. at 13-14), and in Plaintiff's
Exhibit #1, (R. at 100).

III.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions will be
determinative of the outcome of this case.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§
§

30-3-5(7)(a)
30-3-5(7)(b)
30-3-5(7)(c)
30-3-5(7)(f)
30-3-5(7)(h)

(Supp.
(Supp.
(Supp.
(Supp.
(Supp.

1997)
1997)
1997)
1997)
1997)

Complete verbatim copies of the foregoing statutory
provisions are set forth in the Addendum submitted herewith.
10

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION BELOW
This is an appeal from the Second District Court's decision
in a divorce proceeding following a short-term marriage. Mr.
Madsen filed a Complaint for divorce on December 17, 1996,
twenty-nine months and one day after the parties were married.
The Court issued its Minute Entry requiring Mr. Madsen to pay
temporary alimony in the amount of $250.00 per month on April 21,
1997.

Trial was held before the Honorable Michael G. Allphin on

July 10, 1997. Judge Allphin signed the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce on October 28, 1997,
wherein
1.

Mr. Madsen was awarded the Decree
of Divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences;

2.

Mr. Madsen was ordered to pay alimony to Mrs.
Madsen in the amount of $550.00 per month for 35
months, and

3.

Mr. Madsen was ordered to pay Mrs. Madsen's
attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00.

Mr. Madsen timely filed this Notice of Appeal on November
21, 1997.
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Madsen and Defendant/Appellee Shauna M. Madsen were
11

married on or about July 16, 1994. (Tr. at 9.)
2.

During the marriage, the parties and their children

lived in the home owned by Mr. Madsen1s mother prior to the
marriage. (Tr. at 24-25.)

The home is located at 136 East 1200

South, Bountiful, Utah. (Id.)
3.

On May 16, 1996, a Quit-Claim deed was executed by Mr.

Madsenfs mother that made Mr. Madsen and his mother legal joint
tenants of the home. (Tr. at 32-33; R. at 166-67.)

Mr. Madsen

also co-signed on a mortgage obligation incurred with Fleet
Mortgage in order that an apartment could be built for his mother
in the residence. (Tr. at 26-27; R. at 164, 168-175.) Mr.
Madsen1s interest in the home was his own separate property. (R.
at 193.)

By virtue of the Trust Deed with Fleet Mortgage, Mr.

Madsen was obligated to make payments of $557.00 for the mortgage
obligation, $72.00 for real property taxes, $25.00 for real
property insurance, and $50.00 for home maintenance, lawn care,
and repairs. (Tr. at 13- 14; R. at 100, 168-175.)
4.

In March, 1995, Mr. Madsen was arrested for domestic

violence and pled no contest to the charges (Tr. at 138-39, 15354. )
5.

In November, 1996, there was a physical confrontation

involving Mr. Madsen, Mrs. Madsen, and the sons of Mrs. Madsen.
(Tr. at 136-38.)

Mr. Madsen was arrested for domestic violence
12

and pled guilty to assault. (Tr. at 152-53.)
6.
136.)

In early December, 1996, the parties separated. (Tr. at

Mr. Madsen subsequently filed a Complaint for divorce. (R.
Mrs. Madsen filed an Answer to Mr. Madsen1s Complaint

at 1-5.)

in which she admitted to irreconcilable differences as grounds
for divorce. (R. at 9.)

Mrs. Madsen also sought alimony "based

upon the earning capacities and relative needs of the parties."
(IcL.)
7.

The parties1 respective incomes during the marriage, and

prior to separation, were as follows:
Party

1994

1995

1996

Mr. Madsen

$49,706.78

$49,509.50

$53f370.99

Mrs. Madsen

$19,865.15

$17,103.45

$18,814.30

(R. at 120.)
8.

Trial was held before Judge Michael G. Allphin of the

Second District Court on July 10, 1997. (R. at 191.)
9.

Judge Allphin signed the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on October 28, 1997.
10.
28, 1997.
11.

(R. at 200.)

Judge Allphin signed the Decree of Divorce on October
(R. at 203.)
Mr. Madsen timely filed his Notice of Appeal on

November 21, 1997.

(R. at 206.)

13

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial judge erred in finding that Mr. Madsen has the
ability to pay alimony.

Mr. Madsen1s undisputed and unchallenged

monthly expenses are only $13.00 less than his net monthly
income.

By reducing, sua sponte, Mr. Madsen*s monthly expenses

in the sum of $542.00, the trial judge improperly awarded alimony
in the sum of $550.00 per month.
The trial judge also improperly used Mr. Madsen1s "fault"
(i.e., two (2) incidents of domestic violence) to punish Mr.
Madsen by awarding alimony that he cannot afford to pay.
Further, the trail judge offered no analysis or explanation for
awarding alimony for thirty-five (35) months beyond the fact that
the marriage lasted thirty-five (35) months.
Finally, the trial judge did not have sufficient evidence
before him to justify the attorney's fees awarded in this case.
The trial judge also failed to analyze the factors set forth in
caselaw that are necessary to justify an award of attorney's
fees.

14

VII.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING MR. MADSEN
HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY.
A.
The Undisputed Evidence Demonstrated that Mr.
Madsen's Automobile, Utility, Telephone, and
Food and Household Expenses Were $395 Higher
than the Amount Found by the Court
Mr. Madsen testified that Plaintiffs Exhibit #1, (R. at
100), accurately reflected the following monthly expenses:
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Auto Expenses

$450.00
200.00
125.00
250.00

Those expenses were never questioned by Mrs. Madsen's counsel,
nor was it ever argued those expenses were unreasonable in
closing argument.

In its Findings of Fact, however, the trial

court, sua sponte and without explanation, determined that it
would consider Mr. Madsen's expenses as follows:
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Auto Expenses

$350.00
100.00
30.00
150.00

TOTAL NET DIFFERENCE

(-$100.00)
(-$100.00)
(-$ 95.00)
(-$100.00)
-$395.00

Where there is disputed evidence about expenses, it is clearly
within the trial court's authority to "accept, modify, reduce, or
15

reject" a party's claimed expenses. Willey v. Willey, 333 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, 11 (Utah 1997).

Here, however, the evidence was

undisputed and unchallenged.

Accordingly, the trial court's

Findings of Fact, insofar as they reduced Mr. Madsen's undisputed
and unchallenged expenses, are clearly erroneous.

Accordingly,

based on the record, this Court is obligated to order the trial
court to reduce the alimony award by $395.00 per month so as to
properly reflect Mr. Madsen's ability to pay alimony.
B.
The Trial Court Erroneously Determined that
Mr. Madsen had No Obligation to Pay Property
Taxes, Homeowner's Insurance Premiums, and
Residential Maintenance Costs in the Amount
of $147 per Month
Mr. Madsen testified that he was obligated to pay property
taxes, homeowner's insurance, and home maintenance costs in the
amount of $147.00 per month.

This testimony is further supported

by the Trust Deed Mr. Madsen had signed in connection with the
real property.
unchallenged.

Again, this evidence was undisputed and
In its Findings of Fact, however, the trial court

ignored this evidence, sua sponte and without explanation, and
determined that
9. Because the Court finds plaintiff's
mother, Evalyn Madsen, owns the real property
located at 136 East 1200 South, Bountiful,
Utah, she has an obligation to pay the
property taxes of $72.00 per month, the
16

homeowners insurance premium of $25.00 per
month and the residential maintenance costs
of $50.00 per month and does not give
plaintiff credit for these expenses because
he has no obligation to pay for those
expenses.
(R. at 194-95.) While there is conflicting evidence regarding
the ownership of the home (See Marshalling of Evidence following
Issue #2), it was undisputed that Mr. Madsen had contractually
agreed to pay these expenses, just as he had contractually agreed
to make payments on the loan.

The trial court's finding that Mr.

Madsen had incurred no such obligation is clearly erroneous, as
it controverts the only evidence before the court on this issue.
This Court should therefore further reduce the alimony award by
$147.00 per month to reflect the reduction in Mr. Madsen1s
ability to pay alimony.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS.
MADSEN
A.
The Court Erred as a Matter of Law in
Awarding Alimony for 35 Months Without Making
Any Findings Supporting an Award of that
Duration
The trial court was statutorily required to consider the
length of the parties1 marriage in determining alimony.
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1997).

See Utah

This requirement is

separate and distinct, however, from the prohibition that an
17

award of alimony can generally be for no longer than the length
of the marriage.

See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997).

By enacting two (2) separate statutory provisions, the
Legislature intended there to be a cap on the duration of an
alimony award while also requiring trial courts to make findings
justifying the duration of an alimony award.

The Legislature did

not intend that the length of the marriage automatically
determine the duration for an award of alimony.
In this case, the trial court engaged in no analysis or
findings to justify an award of alimony for thirty-five (35)
months except for the fact that thirty-five (35) months is the
duration of the marriage.

Further, the trial judge only

mentioned the length of the marriage subsequent to awarding
alimony.

In the Findings of Fact, the trial court "orders

plaintiff to pay alimony to defendant in the sum of $550.00 per
month for a period of thirty-five (35) months, which was the
length of the parties1 marriage." (R. at 195.)

In the

Conclusions of Law, the trial court concluded that "the plaintiff
should be ordered to pay to defendant, as and for alimony, the
sum of $550.00 per month, for a period of thirty-five months
after entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, which time period
equals the length of the parties' marriage." (R. at 199.)
Moreover, the trial court's Minute Entry ignores the requirement
18

to make findings altogether: "The Court will order the plaintiff
to pay $550.00 per month for 35 months to the defendant in
alimony."
It is clear from the record that the trial court failed to
analyze how the length of the marriage had any relationship to
the duration of the alimony award.

Absent such analysis or

Finding of Fact, Mr. Madsen asserts the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding, carte blanche, alimony for the duration
of the marriage.

Unless this Court's determination of Mr,

Madsen's ability to pay makes this issue moot, the trial court's
error in this regard requires that this matter be remanded for
consideration of the length of the marriage.
B.
The Court Awarded Alimony Against Mr. Madsen
To Punish Him For His "Fault,"
The trial court failed to make sufficient findings as to how
Mr. Madsen's fault affected Mrs. Madsen's need for alimony.

The

trial court also failed to find how Mr. Madsen's "fault" impacted
his ability to pay alimony.

The trial court simply stated that:

The Court has considered the issue of fault.
Based upon the evidence presented of
plaintiff's problems with domestic violence
in assaulting defendant and her children, the
Court finds that plaintiff's problems have
been a major cause of the break-up of the
parties' marriage. The Court finds that this
case is one in which fault should be
considered when the Court determines whether
19

or not alimony is appropriate. Given the
fault of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
ability to pay alimony and the defendant's
circumstances involving a lack of reliable
transportation and her inability to provide
for herself/ the Court finds that plaintiff
has the ability to meet some of defendant's
needs and orders plaintiff to pay alimony to
defendant in the sum of $550.00 per month for
a period of thirty-five (35) months, which
was the length of the parties' marriage.
(R. at 195.)
It has long been a tenet of Utah law that alimony is not to
be used to punish one of the parties.

See English v. English,

565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) ("The purpose of alimony is to
provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive damages
on the husband.

Alimony is not intended as a penalty against the

husband nor a reward to the wife."); see also Noble v. Noble, 761
P.2d 1369, 1371-72 (Utah 1988) (husband's tortious shooting of
wife created need for alimony).
In this case, the trial court made no findings that Mr.
Madsen's fault had a direct impact on Mrs. Madsen's need for
alimony.

The inescapable conclusion is that the trial court used

its award of alimony to punish Mr. Madsen for his "fault."
is clearly improper.

This

If the trial court had found that Mr.

Madsen's fault affected Mrs. Madsen's need for alimony, or
lengthened the term for which an award might be necessary, then
the award of alimony might have been properly supported.
20

Here,

however, the trial court made no such finding.
Moreover, that the trial judge intended to punish Mr. Madsen
can be inferred from his sua sponte reduction as to Mr. Madsen's
undisputed and unchallenged monthly expenses.

Why would the

trial judge, without explanation, reduce a party's monthly
expenses unless the intent was to punish that party?
is clear —
Madsen!

The answer

the trial judge wanted to, improperly, punish Mr.

Had the trial judge truly believed Mr. Madsen1s

undisputed and unchallenged expenses were unreasonable, then the
trial judge could have made express findings supporting the
unreasonableness of the same.

That the trial judge made no

express findings confirms his intent to improperly punish Mr.
Madsen.
C.
The Court Erred in Determining its Award of
Alimony Without Considering Restoring Each
Party to the Condition that Existed at the
Time of Their Marriage
When faced with a short-term marriage that has produced no
children, two (2) separate statutory provisions give the trial
court the discretion to consider restoring the parties to the
standard of living they enjoyed at the time of the marriage.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(7)(f) and 30-3-5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997).

In

this case, Mr. Madsen1s counsel urged the trial court to do so.
The parties had been married less than three years, there were no
21

children born as issue of the marriage, and Mrs. Madsen's income
had increased since the parties were married.
Although the trial court has discretion to consider (or not
to consider) restoring Mrs. Madsen to her pre-marital
circumstances, Mr. Madsen asserts the trial court abused its
discretion by simply ignoring the issue.

The issue was clearly

argued before the trial court and the parties' circumstances
completely mirror the situation contemplated by the statutory
provisions.

By not making a finding as to this disputed issue,

the trial court abused its discretion.

Accordingly, Mr. Madsen

requests that, unless this issue is mooted by this Court's
determination of other issues in this case, this matter be
remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider
restoring the parties to the position they were in at the time of
the marriage.
Ill
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES
A.
The Court Erred in Awarding Attorney's Fees
without Making Any Findings About the
Services Performed or the Reasonableness of
the Fees.
The trial court's Finding of Fact concerning the amount of
attorney's fees is limited to the simple statement that "The
22

Court finds the sum of $2,000,00 to be reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred herein."

(R. at 196). The Utah Supreme Court

has held that awarding attorney's fees is a "highly factdependent process."

Willey, 333 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11. In doing

so, the court is required to consider the following factors:
"'the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of
hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and the
result obtained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved.1"
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893
(Utah 1996) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1985))).

The trial court's findings and conclusions completely

fail to reflect any analysis of the required factors.
Moreover, the trial judge in the case at bar had less
evidence before him than this Court has previously found
insufficient in Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

In Talley, this Court reversed an award of attorney's

fees based upon the proffer of counsel.

This Court reversed the

trial judge, even though the proffer included an itemization of
time and costs for both the attorney and a clerk, as well as
hourly rates, because the reasonableness of the fees was not
established.

Id. at 84.

In contrast, the record herein does not

reflect any itemization of the fees and costs incurred herein.
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The trial judge thus made no legitimate finding that the fees
were reasonable or necessarily incurred.

Since defendant failed

to carry her burden of proof so as to justify a claim for
attorney's fees, this Court should remand for entry of an order
directing each party to pay their own fees and costs incurred
below.
B.
The Court Erred in Awarding Legal Fees Based
on Mr. Madsen's Interest in Real Property
The trial court's findings on the issue of attorney's fees
directly conflict with its findings related to another issue.
The trial court's award of attorney's fees rested on the finding
that
"based on plaintiff's legal interest in the
real property located at 136 East, 1200
South, Bountiful, Utah, he has equity in said
real property which defendant does not have
and the Court therefore finds that plaintiff
should be ordered to pay attorney's fees on
behalf of defendant."
(R. at 196.)

This finding is impossible to reconcile with the

trial court's finding that
"Because ... plaintiff's mother, Evalyn
Madsen, owns the real property located at 136
East, 1200 South, Bountiful, Utah, she has an
obligation to pay the property taxes of
$72.00 per month, the homeowners insurance
premium of $25.00 per month and the
residential maintenance costs of $50.00 per
month and [the court] does not give Mr.
24

Madsen credit for the expenses because he has
no obligation to pay for these expenses."
(R. at 194-95.)
Taken together, the trial court appears to have found a
second way to punish Mr. Madsen for his "fault" in this matter

—

make Mr. Madsen pay attorney's fees by indirectly ordering him to
borrow against his interest in real property, but refusing to
permit him to claim the necessary expenses to preserve that
interest as legitimate monthly expenses. What a "Catch 22!" Mr.
Madsen has no obligation to preserve real property when it comes
to analyzing his ability to pay alimony but that same "interest"
justifies ordering attorney's fees.

The logical inconsistency in

the trial judge's analysis cannot be reconciled without
concluding that he intended to again improperly punish Mr.
Madsen.
CONCLUSION
This Court should remand for an entry of an Order directing
that Mr. Madsen*s monthly alimony obligation be reduced to
properly reflect his undisputed and unchallenged monthly
expenses.

This Court should further direct the trial court to

make sufficient findings to justify the duration of the alimony
award.

Lastly, the parties should be ordered to pay their own
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attorney's fees and costs incurred.
Dated this

day of

, 1998.
Respectfully submitted,

(hillip W. Dyer
Kevin C. Timken
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Jd) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of^
icial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases
e l ^ n t h e decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree af^^^pPGlt
of n ^ » | D o n d e n t , upon the petitioner's affidavit.
(2) T h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c e p t the decree of divorce, may be sealed bv^^^PBTthe court
upon the moW^Bfeither party. The sealed portion of t h ^ J ^ p e v a i l a b l e to the
public only u p o ^ ^ ^ t t i e r of the court. The concernec^^Bes^ the attorneys of
record or a t t o r n e ) ^ ^ k e a notice of appearanc^^Hreaction, the Office of
Recovery Services i f l ^ ^ ^ t o the proceedin^^j^^pplied for or is receiving
public assistance, or t h e ^ ^ ^ y i a v e full accfl^^^ne entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequl^Bkngs t o ^ ^ ^ R e or amend the decree.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, S
1909, ch. 60, S 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 5 | ^ p f l 9 H
ch. 59, * 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2 ^ ^ V c h . 116^
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, £ 1; 1 £ ^ B T 104, fe 1;
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1 9 9 1 ^ B p T 3 5 ; 1992, ch.
98, $ 1; 1992, ch. 2 9 ( ^ ^ R 9 9 5 , ch. 62, § 1;
1997, ch. 47, § 2 y ^ H R i . 157, * 1.
A m e n d m e n ^ ^ K ^ — The 1995 amendment, eftectu^^H^1, 1995, added the second
sentenc^^^^Bfection (1Kb) and in the second
sentei^^^KTbsection (l)(d) substituted "shall
Secree*' for "shall make and file find[ decree" and added the language beginr
"or, in the case o f at the end.

The 1997 amendment by ch. 47, effective July
1997, substituted "petitioner" for "plaintiff"
"respondent" for "defendant** throughout
amendment by ch. 157, effective
May^^^HfejuSubsection (l)(c) deleted "and
the plainn^^^Bjgd an action in the judicial
district as dera^^Hfection 78-1-2.1 where the
pilot program sn^^Hkadministered" after
"child or children" n^^Mfcfct sentence and
made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as r^^^Hfc^>y the
Office of Legislative Research ^^^^B^eral
Counsel.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses

30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

212

incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
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(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify ab'mony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, * 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, * 4; C.L. 1917, * 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, c h . 72, * 3;
1975, ch. 8 1 , * 1; 1979, c h . 110, $ 1; 1984, ch.
13, $ 1; 1985, c h . 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, * 1;
1991, ch. 257, * 4; 1993, c h . 152, * 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, c h . 284, & 1; 1995, c h . 330,
§ 1; 1997, c h . 232, ^ 4.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted a provision
from Subsection (3) for support and maintenance orders, deleted former Subsections (5)
and (6), providing t h a t alimony terminates
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, by the payee, added

Subsections 7) to (9), renumbered former Subsections (7) a n d (8) as (5) and (6), and made
stylistic changes
The 1997 a m e n d m e n t , effective July 1, 1997
substituted "Recovery Services" for "Parts 4
and 5 n in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsection (l)(e) which provided for an assesment
against the obligor for a check handling fee
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Laws 1995, ch 330
which amended this section, provides in ^ 2
that the Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted
m any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose "

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAMS, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN,
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Plaintiff,

HON. MICHAEL G. ALLPfflN
MINUTE ENTRY

VS.

SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK
MADSEN,
Defendant,

Date: July 10, 1997
Case No. 964702009 DA
Clerk: K.W. Elmore
Bailiff: D. Hay good

VIDEOTAPED
This matter comes before the Court for a DOMESTIC TRIAL.
The plaintiff is present and is represented by counsel Phillip W. Dyer. The
defendant is present and is represented by counsel D. Michael Nielsen.
Mr. Nielsen makes opening statements.
Scott E. Madsen is sworn and testifies.
Plaintiffs exhibit # 2, 1, 7, 6, 4, 5, 3, 14, 9, 10, 12, 11 & 13 are offered and
received. Plaintiff exhibit # 8 is offered but is rejected.
Evelyn S. Madsen is sworn and testifies.
Shauna Madsen is sworn and testifies.
Defendant's exhibit # 1, 2, & 3 are offered and received.
Mr. Dyer makes closing statements. He requests the Court to put the parties
back to where they were before the marriage and not allow alimony to the defendant.
Mr. Nielsen makes closing statements. He requests the Court to order the
plaintiff to pay alimony and attorney fees.
The Court find that it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter and that
the plaintiffs testimony has substantially proven the allegations in the divorce complaint.
The Court grants a divorce based on irreconcilable differences to become final upon entry by
the judgment clerk. The Court also finds the home belonged to the plaintiffs mother,
Evelyn S. Madsen, that the plaintiff co-signed the trust deed note with Evelyn Madsen and
the parties only benefited from the mortgage payment. The Court finds the parties did not
pay or work more while in the home and the home belongs to Evelyn Madsen and the
plaintiff has a separate interest in the home. The Court will not award interest in the

property to the defendant. On the issue of alimony, the Court finds the defendant has
expenses in the amount of $2760.00 a month which includes the cost of new transportation
which she will need. The defendant has a net income of $1380.00 a month and the
defendant has a legal right to child support in the amount of $600.00 a month from her
previous husband. After that amount, the defendant is still in need of $7S0.00 a month for
expenses which she does not have. The Court finds the plaintiff has a net income of
$2911.00 a month plus hockey refereeing of $150.00 a month. The Court finds the plaintiff
has reasonable expenses in the amount of $2506.00 a month which gives him an excess of
$550.00 a month. The Court finds it is Evelyn Madsen's responsibility to pay the
maintenance, property tax and property insurance for the home. The Court finds that fault is
an issue to the plaintiff. The Court will order the plaintiff to pay $550.00 a month for 35
months to the defendant in alimony. The plaintiff will be responsible for the $100.00 tax fee
which was already paid. The plaintiff will also have a judgment for $2,000.00 for the
defendant's attorney fees. Mr. Dyer will prepare the order.

PHILLIP W. DYER
(4315)
Attorney for Plaintiff
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
(801)
363-5000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN,

ji FINDINGS OF FACT AND
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

;

SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN,
Defendant.

i Civil No. 96-4702009 DA
;

Judge Michael G. Allphin

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Court Judge presiding, on
the 10th day of July, 1997, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the
plaintiff appearing in person with his counsel, Phillip W. Dyer,
and the defendant appearing in person with her counsel, D.
Michael Nielsen.

Thereupon, the Court having heard the testimony

presented from witnesses, having considered the exhibits received
and all evidence before the Court, the parties having been sworn
and testified, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now
makes and enters its
1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-1, et seq., the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over the above-entitled matter.
2.

The Court finds that the plaintiff is, and was at all

times mentioned herein, an actual and bona fide resident of Davis
County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months prior to
the filing of the action herein.
3.

The parties are husband and wife having been married on

or about July 16, 1994, in Bountiful, Utah.
4.

There are no (0) children born as issue of the parties'

marriage, and none are expected.
5.

The Court finds that there have arisen irreconcilable

differences between the parties and the plaintiff is therefore
entitled to a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon
entry.
6.

The Court finds that the real property located at 136

East 1200 South, Bountiful, Utah, belonged to Evalyn Madsen,
plaintiff's mother, prior to the parties' marriage, and she owned
the same free and clear at that time. After the parties'
marriage, plaintiff co-signed a loan obligation with his mother
in order that an apartment could be built for plaintiff's mother
such that plaintiff and defendant would be able to live in
plaintiff's mother's residence.

The Court finds the parties
2

benefitted (at least to the extent of the mortgage payments they
were paying) due to their possession and enjoyment of the
property during the marriage•

The Court finds that the parties

did not pay more (nor work more) than what the benefit was to
them.

It was the intent of the parties that the property

equitably belonged to Evalyn Madsen and the Court so finds.

The

Court finds that plaintiff had an expectation to inherit the real
property, and after execution of a Quit-claim Deed, a legal joint
tenancy was created between plaintiff and his mother, Evalyn
Madsen, such that plaintiff obtained an interest in the property
as his own separate property.

The Court finds that no marital

interest exists in the residence and defendant is therefore not
entitled to receive any equity interest from said residence.
7.

The Court finds that defendant has monthly living

expenses of $2,560.00 and is in need of reliable transportation
at an expected cost of $200.00 per month.

The Court thus finds

that defendant has monthly living expenses of $2,760.00, which
includes expenses for her minor children who are not children of
this marriage.

The Court finds that defendant's monthly net

income is $1,380.00, leaving her with a $1,380.00 per month
deficiency.

The Court finds that defendant has a legal right to

receive child support from the natural father of her minor
children in the sum of $600.00 per month.
3

In considering

defendant's needs, the Court deducted the child support
obligation from her monthly deficiency and the defendant's net
monthly deficiency is $780.00.
8.

The Court finds that plaintiff has a net income of

$2,911.00 per month from his full-time employment plus $150.00
per month generated as a hockey referee.

The Court finds that

plaintiff thus has $3,061.00 per month in net income.

The Court

finds that plaintiff's reasonable monthly living expenses are
$2,506.20, calculated as follows:
AMOUNT

EXPENSE
Rent
Food and household goods
Utilities
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
Medical expense
Dental expense
Child support
Entertainment
Tithing
Automobile expense
Automobile payment
Installment debt
TOTAL
9.

557,.00
350 .00
100,.00
30,.00
25,.00
50..00
25..00
25,.00
433..20
75..00
361.,00
150.,00
85.,00
240..00
$2"r506.,20
$

Because the Court finds plaintiff's mother, Evalyn

Madsen, owns the real property located at 136 East 1200 South,
Bountiful, Utah, she has an obligation to pay the property taxes
of $72.00 per month, the homeowners insurance premium of $25.00
per month and the residential maintenance costs of $50.00 per
4

month and does not give plaintiff credit for these expenses
because he has no obligation to pay for those expenses•

Based on

the Court's finding concerning plaintiff's expenses, plaintiff
has $555.00 available to him beyond his living expenses.
10.

The Court has considered the issue of fault.

Based

upon the evidence presented of plaintiff's problems with domestic
violence in assaulting defendant and her children, the Court
finds that plaintiff's problems have been a major cause of the
break-up of the parties' marriage,

The Court finds that this

case is one in which fault should be considered when the Court
considers whether or not alimony is appropriate.

Given the fault

of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ability to pay alimony and the
defendant's circumstances involving a lack of reliable
transportation and her inability to provide for herself, the
Court finds that plaintiff has the ability to meet some of
defendant's needs and orders plaintiff to pay alimony to
defendant in the sum of $550.00 per month for a period of thirtyfive (35) months, which was the length of the parties' marriage.
The plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony automatically
terminates at the end of the thirty-five (35) month period
herein.

Further, said alimony shall also terminate in the event

defendant remarries or cohabitates with another person prior to
the expiration of the thirty-five (35) month period herein.
5

11.

Based upon plaintiff's ability to pay and plaintiff's

actual payment of the same, the Court finds that plaintiff should
be ordered to pay the tax fees incurred in the sum of $100.00.
12.

The Court finds that defendant cannot pay her

attorney's fees in this case but plaintiff's ability to pay
attorney's fees is also limited due to his income and the alimony
obligation ordered herein.

However, based on plaintiff's legal

interest in the real property located at 136 East 1200 South,
Bountiful, Utah, he has access to equity in said real property
which defendant does not have and the Court therefore finds that
plaintiff should be ordered to pay attorney's fees on behalf of
defendant.

The Courts finds the sum of $2,000.00 to be

reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

Judgment

shall be entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff in
the sum of $2,000.00.
13.

The Court finds that there are no medical or

counselling expenses currently outstanding.

In the event that

medical or counselling expenses arise in the future, the Court
finds that defendant can file a lawsuit for such sums.
14.

The Court finds the parties have agreed that each of

the parties should be awarded, free and clear of any claim of the
other, their respective retirement account(s) and all other
personal property in their respective possession.
6

WHEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of Fact, now
makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court concludes that the subject matter jurisdiction

and grounds for divorce requirements of U.C.A. 30-3-1, et seq.,
have been met such that plaintiff shall be awarded a Decree of
Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, dissolving
the bonds of matrimony from the defendant, the same to become
final upon entry.
2.

The Court concludes that no marital interest exists in

the real property and residence located at 136 East 1200 South,
Bountiful, Utah, and defendant should not be awarded any interest
in or to said real property and residence.
3.

The Court concludes that defendant has monthly living

expenses of $2,560.00 and is in need of reliable transportation
at an expected cost of $200.00 per month.

The Court concludes

that defendant has monthly living expenses of $2,7 60.00, which
includes expenses for her minor children who are not children of
this marriage.

The Court concludes that defendant's monthly net

income is $1,380.00, leaving her with a $1,380.00 per month
deficiency.

The Court also concludes that defendant has a legal

right to receive child support from the natural father of her
minor children in the sum of $600.00 per month.
7

In considering

defendant's needs, the Court deducted the child support
obligation from her monthly deficiency.

The Court concludes that

defendant's net monthly deficiency is thus $780.00.
4.

The Court concludes that plaintiff has a net income of

$2/911.00 per month from his full-time employment plus $150.00
per month generated as a hockey referee.

The Court concludes

that plaintiff thus has $3,061.00 per month in net income.

The

Court concludes that plaintiff's reasonable monthly living
expenses are $2,506.20. The Court concludes that plaintiff has
income available to him beyond his living expenses in the sum of
$555.00 per month.
5.

The Court concludes that plaintiff should not be given

credit for the property taxes of $72.00 per month, the homeowners
insurance premium of $25.00 per month and the residential
maintenance costs of $50.00 per month, which are the sole
obligation of Evalyn Madsen to pay and for which plaintiff has no
obligation to pay.
6.

The Court concludes that the issue of fault should be

considered when the Court considers whether or not alimony is
appropriate in this case.
7.

The Court concludes that plaintiff has the ability to

pay alimony in the sum of $550.00 per month.
8.

The Court concludes that defendant is in need of alimony
8

in, at least, the sum of $550.00 per month.
9.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff should be ordered

to pay to defendant, as and for alimony, the sum of $550.00 per
month, for a period of thirty-five (35) months after entry of the
Decree of Divorce herein, which time period equals the length of
the parties' marriage.

The plaintiff's obligation to pay

alimony automatically terminates at the end of the thirty-five
(35) month period herein.

Further, said alimony shall also

terminate in the event defendant remarries or cohabitates with
another person prior to the expiration of the thirty-five (35)
month period herein.
10.

The Court concludes that plaintiff should be ordered to

pay the tax fees incurred in the sum of $100.00.
11.

The Court concludes that plaintiff should be ordered to

pay defendant's attorney's fees.

The Court further concludes

that the sum of $2,000.00 constitutes reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred herein and judgment should be entered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00 for
the same.
12.

Based on their agreement, the Court concludes that each

of the parties should be awarded, free and clear of any claim of
the other, their respective retirement account(s) and all other

9

personal property in their respective possession.
MADE AND ENTERED this

g^^^dav of

-/£^T

1997

BY THE COURT:

H0N6RABLE ftl
District Court

Approved as to form:/

lO/ss/qr)
Date

Attorney for Defendant

Pbg/h.idj«n.fla/DIVII
M145.00
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. ALLPHIN
ge

PHILLIP W. DYER
(4315)
Attorney for Plaintiff
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
(801)
363-5000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT EUGENE MADSEN,
Plaintiff,

I DECREE OF DIVORCE
;

vs.

;

SHAUNA MARIE BULLOCK MADSEN,

]i Civil No. 96-4702009 DA

Defendant.

]i Judge Michael G. Allphin

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Court Judge presiding, on
the 10th day of July, 1997, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the
plaintiff appearing in person with his counsel, Phillip W. Dyer,
and the defendant appearing in person with her counsel, D.
Michael Nielsen.

Thereupon, the Court having heard the testimony

presented from witnesses, having considered the exhibits received
and all evidence before the Court, the parties having been sworn
and testified, the Court having made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefore,

1

Y _.&cL

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The plaintiff be, and is hereby, awarded a Decree of

Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, dissolving
the bonds of matrimony from defendant, the same to become final
upon entry.
2.

The defendant is not awarded any equitable interest in

or to the real property and residence located at 136 East 1200
South, Bountiful, Utah.
3.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in

the sum of $550.00 per month for a period of thirty-five (35)
months after entry of the Decree of Divorce herein at which time
plaintiff's alimony obligation shall automatically terminate.
Said alimony shall also terminate in the event that defendant
remarries or cohabitates with another person prior to the
expiration of the thirty-five (35) month period herein.
4.

The Court orders plaintiff to pay the tax fees incurred

in the sum of $100.00.
5.

The Court orders plaintiff to pay the sum of $2,000.00

as and for defendant's attorney's fees.

Judgment shall be

entered in favor defendant and against plaintiff in the sum of
$2,000.00 as and for the same.
6.

The Court determines that there are no medical or

counselling expenses currently outstanding.
2

In the event that

medical or counselling expenses arise in the future, the Court
orders that defendant can file a lawsuit for such sums.
7.

The parties are each awarded, free and clear of any

claim of the other party, their respective retirement account(s)
and all other personal property in their respective possession.

(lOT

DATED this ^ i ^ d a y of

. 1997.

BY THE COURT:

JORABLE MICHAE&/G. ALLPHIN
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Date

^A^torney for Defendant

Pbg/Mads.n.dac/DIV"
M1A5.00
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

STATE OF UTAH

)

)ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Phillip W. Dyer, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he served
MADSEN

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT SCOTT EUGENE

upon the following parties by placing four (4) true

and correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed to:
D. Michael Nielsen, Esq.
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
and mailing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
the

day of

., 1998.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

i; 1998,

Jbr.ftj.U*^.
Notary Public
My Commission expires:

fk\/'drju^^

Residing at:i
S ^ l t Lake C o u n t y ,
NOTARY PUBLld:
Kathleen J. Gliiiaa*
138 So. Main St„ No, 316
U l t Uko City, Utah 84101
My Commission Expire
December 23,1990

STATE OF UTAH J

Utah

